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Abstract 
This paper estimates the causal effect of education on adolescent crime by exploiting a compulsory 
education reform implemented in 1999 in Italy. To identify the causal relation we use the reform as an 
instrument for adolescent high school enrollment, and compare the offending rates of the cohorts 
affected by the reform with the ones not affected. We find that one percentage point increase in the 
enrollment ratio reduces adolescent crime by 2.47 percent, and that the effect is highly heterogeneous 
across areas and mostly influenced by the degree of social capital and by the presence of organized 
crime. In areas characterized by pervasive organized crime, preventing adolescents from staying on 
the streets, by keeping them at school, is not enough to ensure the same crime reduction effect as in 
areas where organized crime is not pervasive. 
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1 Introduction
Growing up in high criminal density areas means having to deal from an early age with altered
economic, political and social contexts. The legal economy is distorted by the illegal rules,
wiping out any possibility for clean market competition, while a parallel economy made of
drug dealing, usury and extortion flourishes and subtracts human and financial resources from
the legal economy, preventing its development (Saviano, 2012). Starting from the late 1990s,
all industrialized countries have been characterized by a dramatic increase in juvenile crime;
the lack or the insufficiency of supervision by parents or institutions has been seen as the main
predictor of delinquency (UN, 2003). However, little is known about the determinants of criminal
behavior in areas at risk of criminal associations and on the potential effects of policies to be
used to counter adolescent crime in these areas.
In this paper we consider one characteristic, which has been broadly identified as an im-
portant policy instrument against criminal behavior, i.e. education. Education and school
attendance may affect juvenile crime through several channels (Hjalmarsson and Lochner, 2012,
Jacob and Lefgren, 2003). School may have an incapacitating effect, through which it prevents
adolescents from committing crime, just because criminal opportunities are generally more lim-
ited at schools than on the streets. Of course, this effect depends on the ease with which students
can engage in criminal activities or can displace them during the time outside school (Anderson
et al., 2013). A second mechanism operates through the improvement of skills, which are re-
munerated in the labor market and should change the decisions to engage in criminal activities
through a change in the expected probability of finding a legal job after school. This human
capital effect may affect youth crime immediately, but it may also last over time. Finally, social
networks may play a substantive role in shaping adolescent crime, mainly because risky and
criminal behaviors are particularly influenced by peers, especially in the years of adolescence
(Bayer et al., 2009, Card and Giuliano, 2013, Patacchini and Zenou, 2009). While the inca-
pacitation and the human capital channels imply negative effects of education on crime, the
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effects of social interaction cannot be established a priori as peer effects may either reinforce or
attenuate the individual propensity to engage in risky behaviors.
In this paper we examine the empirical relationship between high school attendance and ado-
lescent involvement in criminal activities by exploiting a school leaving age reform, implemented
in Italy in 1999 (hereafter, simply referred to as the Reform), which increased compulsory ed-
ucation by one year. Italy is an interesting setting for the study of the effects of education on
youth crime and for assessing whether the crime reducing effect of education, found in several
pieces of this literature, might be affected by strong differences in social capital, institutions,
school characteristics and, most importantly, the presence of Mafia-type criminal organizations.
As documented by Guiso et al. (2013), Nannicini et al. (2013), Paccagnella and Sestito (2014),
there is a large territorial heterogeneity in the social capital and cultural related traits that can
be traced back to distant political and historical factors; the country is also characterized by sig-
nificant differences in terms of Mafia pervasiveness (Bandiera, 2003, Barone and Narciso, 2013,
Daniele and Marani, 2011, Pinotti, 2012). The latter point is crucial, since, as outlined in the
quotation above, the school can be one of the few policy instruments to be used to counter ado-
lescent involvement in criminal organizations (Saviano, 2012), which has dramatically increased
in recent years. Recent data from the National Bureau of Statistics and the Italian Ministry of
the Interior have shown that, from 2007 to 2011, the number of teenagers under 17 years old
charged with the specific offense of mafia-type criminal association has increased by 23.7 percent
in Italy.1
In the last decades, several empirical works have assessed the effects of education on criminal
behavior (Lochner, 2011). The work closest to our empirical strategy is that of Machin et al.
(2011), which assesses the causal effect of education on the crime rate exploiting a compulsory
leaving age reform, implemented during the 70s in UK. Machin et al. (2011) focus on the
long-term effect of education on crime, since they look at the crime rates of adult males. A few
1Art. 416bis of the Italian Penal Code pertains to the specific offense of mafia-type criminal association. ISTAT
Police Force database, national data from 2007 to 2011 (available at http://dati.istat.it).
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empirical studies have looked at the contemporaneous effects of educational policies on adolescent
crime and most of them focus on US data (Hjalmarsson and Lochner, 2012).2 Anderson (2013),
Bertheleon and Kruger (2011), Luallen (2006) and Jacob and Lefgren (2003) estimate, in a
reduced form setting, the effects of different types of school policies which induced exogenous
variation in the time spent at school by young students, while Heller et al. (2013) analyze the
effect of a randomized experiment aimed at increasing adolescent time spent at school in high-
crime neighborhoods of Chicago. Anderson (2013) estimates that the exposure to a minimum
drop-out age of 18 reduces the arrest rate for 16 to 18 year olds by 10.27 incidences per 1,000
individuals of the age group population. Bertheleon and Kruger (2011) find that a school
reform that lengthened the time spent at school from half to full-day in Chilean municipalities
significantly decreases youth crime rates and teen pregnancies. Luallen (2006) and Jacob and
Lefgren (2003) examine the effects of extra days off from school because of teachers in-service
days or teacher strikes: Luallen (2006) shows that total juvenile crime increases by an average
of 21.4 percent on days when strikes occur; Jacob and Lefgren (2003) find that property crimes
decrease by 14 percent on days when the school is in session, while violent crimes increase by 28
percent over the same days. To the best of our knowledge, only Luallen (2006) takes into account
how the effect of education on crime might differ because of territorial characteristics: in fact,
he shows that the sizable effects on youth crime rates come from urban areas only. Recently,
some studies have looked at the connections between social capital and crime. For instance,
Akomak and ter Weel (2012), using data from the Netherlands, show that social capital is
negatively correlated to measures of crime and it is able to explain a large part of the territorial
heterogeneity in crime. Similarly, Buonanno et al. (2009) use data from Italian provinces to
investigate the effects of social capital on crime rates. The authors find that both civic norms
and associational networks have a negative and significant effect on property crimes.
This paper contributes to the literature in three significant ways. First, we provide causal
2Only Bertheleon and Kruger (2011) use data from Chile.
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estimates of the contemporaneous effects of high school attendance on adolescent crime. In fact,
we provide both the reduced form effect of the Reform (i.e. the intention-to-treat parameter,
ITT) and the local average treatment effect (LATE), exploiting the exogenous variation in the
enrollment rate induced by the Reform in an instrumental variable setting. While the ITT may
represent the most policy relevant parameter, only through 2SLS estimation we can provide
evidence of the causal link between education and crime measures. Second, our estimates are
based on newly available administrative records which precisely identify age and gender of all the
offenders, as well as the province where the offense took place. This means that we can identify
not only youths who have been jailed or arrested, but also all others who have been reported
to the judicial authority and then have benefited from alternative measures to prison. In fact,
most of the adolescents reported to the judicial authority benefit from ad hoc measures, such as
correctional youth centers, family control or jail suspension (Dipartimento di Giustizia Minorile,
2007). Third, in addition to documenting a crime reducing effect of education induced by the
reform under consideration, we also show how this effect changes across the Italian territory,
and to which extent it depends on local institution, school characteristics and the presence of
organized crime. To this purpose, we exploit classical measures of social capital as a proxy for
civic capital, policy relevant measures of school characteristics, such as average class size and
student-to-teacher ratio, and measures of the pervasiveness of mafia-type criminal organizations
taken from the criminology literature.
To assess the causal effect of education on adolescent crime, we exploit a newly available
dataset containing aggregated administrative records of all 14, 15 and 16 year olds reported by
the police to the judicial authorities, matched with enrollment rates in the first, second and
third year of high school. We provide causal estimates of the effects of youth enrollment ratio on
adolescent offending rate, adopting a 2SLS empirical strategy and comparing the offending rates
of the cohorts affected by the reform (our treatment group) with those of the cohorts not affected
by the reform (our control group). We also exploit this exogenous shift in the enrollment ratio
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to retrieve heterogeneous effects of education on crime in areas characterized by different levels
of social capital or by the pervasive presence of organized crime. Italy and the 1999 Compulsory
Education Reform provide an ideal setting for this study. While the 1999 Reform increased
compulsory education across the country by one year, without any difference in its timing and
modes of implementation, it exerted a higher incapacitation effect in the South of the country
than it did the North. Southern regions are also the ones where organized crime and Mafias
are highly pervasive in the social, political and economic contexts. The empirical evidence we
provide is also particularly interesting as, differently from other works establishing causal links
between minimum drop-out laws and youth crime, we have the opportunity to focus on a very
recent educational reform.3
Our baseline results show that a one percentage point increase in enrollment rate reduces
adolescent offending rate by 2.47 percent. The reduced form estimate of the effect of the reform
on the juvenile offending rate indicates that increasing compulsory education by one year reduces
adolescent crime by 22.4 percent. We also find that the crime reducing effect of education is
highly heterogeneous across the Italian territory, and mostly influenced by social capital, school
characteristics and the presence of organized crime. Although experiencing a higher increase in
enrollment after the implementation of the Reform, provinces in Southern Italy are characterized
by lower crime reducing effect of education: a one percentage point increase in enrollment rate
would decrease the adolescent offending rate by 3.4 percent in Northern provinces and by less
than a half in the Southern ones. In areas characterized by higher levels of social capital, the
crime reducing effect of education is stronger (in absolute value) than in areas with lower levels
of social capital; school characteristics indicate that areas with more students per class, less
monitoring and a worse teaching environment are characterized by a lower crime reducing effect
of education. Eventually, the crime reducing effect of education is found to be lower in regions
characterized by a pervasive presence of Mafia-type organizations. When we distinguish between
3For example, Machin et al. (2011) use a school leaving age reform which took place in England and Wales in
1972.
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the North and the South of the country, we find that school characteristics play a role only in
Northern areas, while social capital and organized crime matter only for provinces in the South.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Italian education system
and the 1999 Compulsory Education Reform, Section 3 presents our identification strategy and
Section 4 describes the data and provides descriptive statistics. In Section 5 we present the
results, while in Section 6 we conduct several robustness checks. Section 7 concludes and derives
policy implications.
2 The 1999 Compulsory Education Reform
The school system in Italy starts with five years of primary school (grades 1 to 5, corresponding
to ISCED level 1) and three years of junior high school (grades 6 to 8, ISCED level 2). These
two compose the first cycle of the school path which is identical and compulsory for all students.
Secondary education lasts two, three or five years depending on the path chosen (vocational,
technical, academic). Children enroll in the first grade of primary school the year they turn six,
start junior high school when they turn eleven, and enroll in the first grade of high school the
year they turn fourteen. Each student must attend school for at least 8 years and obtain the
junior high school Diploma at the end of the compulsory education path (i.e. at the end of the
first cycle).4
The 1999 Compulsory Education Reform extended compulsory education by one year (from
8 to 9 years).5 The Reform was aimed at increasing high school attendance and the minimum
drop-out age, which was considered relatively low compared to most European countries (Be-
nadusi and Niceforo, 2010). The direct effect of the Reform was that, starting from the school
year 1998/99, all students enrolled in 8th grade could not drop out after the completion of ju-
4This limit was set by the Italian Constitutional Law (1948) which came into force in 1948, right after World
War II. Ordinary laws, as the Reform we are going to illustrate, can increase, but not decrease, the minimum
drop out age (Art. 34). Notice that students are not allowed to dropout before having completed this first cycle.
5Law No. 9/1999 and Ministry Decree 9 August 1999, No. 323. It is usually referred to as the Berlinguer
Reform, from the surname of the Public Education Ministry who signed it. Throughout the paper we will simply
refer to it as the Reform.
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nior high school and were obliged to enroll and attend, at least, the first year of high school.6
The additional year of education had to be carried out attending lessons in a high school (aca-
demic, technical or vocational), and could not be performed in regional training centers nor with
apprenticeship contracts.
[Figure 1 here]
[Figure 2 here]
Figure 1 shows the increasing trend of the enrollment ratio for 14-18 year-old Italian ado-
lescents over almost 20 years (from school year 1981/82 to school year 2009/10). The 14-18
year-old enrollment ratio experienced a sharp and steep increase in the years immediately after
the introduction of the Reform. The vertical lines in the Figure indicate the period considered
in the empirical analysis, ranging between school years 1997/98 and 2003/04.
Figure 2 focuses on the average enrollment ratio of 14-16 year-old students in the period of
implementation of the Reform. The enrollment ratio is obtained as the share of students enrolled
at a certain grade with respect to the corresponding age population.7 The Reform was applied
in the same way and with the same timing over the whole country but determined different
effects across the territory, aligning the territorial differences in the enrollment rates, which were
remarkably lower in the South of the country in the pre-Reform years. This evidence, together
with the richness of the administrative records collected, allows not only to estimate the empirical
relationship between enrollment and crime, but also to study how the same policy prescription
which increased school incapacitation (i.e. one additional year of compulsory schooling) could
have had differential effects on adolescent crime across the territory and which elements might
help to explain such differences.
6The first school year when the Reform came into force was 1999/00, and it was first applied to those students
who were enrolled in the 8th grade in the school year 1998/99.
7For details, see Section 4.1
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3 Identification strategy
Our aim is to estimate the causal effect of education on adolescent criminal behavior. The
identification strategy considers the following equations:
Crimeapt = θ0 + θ1Eduapt + θ2Xapt + θ3Wpt + (1 + ηj)φt + ωp + νapt (1)
Eduapt = δ0 + δ1Reformat + δ2Xapt + δ3Wpt + (1 + ηj)φt + ωp + apt (2)
where Crimeapt represents a measure of criminal activity of the teenagers of age a living
in province p in year t, and Eduapt represents an aggregate educational measure of the cohort
of age a living in province p in year t.8 The vector Xapt includes control variables at province
level varying over time and age group, while the vector Wpt includes several socio-economic
indicators referred to each province p in each year t. More precisely, we control for several socio-
economic characteristics, which have been considered potential determinants of juvenile crime by
the existing literature (Anderson, 2013, Buonanno and Leonida, 2009, Machin et al., 2011): the
vector Xapt includes demographic variables (i.e. the share of youth living in an urban area, the
share of males), while the vector Wpt includes the population at the provincial level, the average
labor force participation rate for 15-24 year olds, which is intended to proxy for the (legal) labor
market opportunities, and provincial per capita value added as a proxy for the general level of
wealth in each province. φt are year fixed effects, ωp are province fixed effects and ηj are fixed
effects at the macro-region level, with j = 1, . . . , 5.9 Province and year fixed effects control
for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity in provincial characteristics and for year trends in
adolescent crimes, respectively. The interaction between year and macro-area dummies captures
relevant territorial dynamics which cannot be included in the vector of control variables, such
8See Section 4.1 for the detailed description of the education and crime measures used.
9The five macro areas include North-West, North-East, Center, South, Islands.
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as macro shocks to the economy which may have different impacts in the areas of the country
or population dynamics (i.e. immigration inflows).10
Equation 1 represents the structural equation describing the contemporaneous relationship
between education and crime. However, estimating Equation 1 using OLS, even after controlling
for several observed and unobserved characteristics, would lead to biased estimates of the effect
of education on crime, because, still, there may be a correlation between adolescent unobserved
traits and their educational choices. For instance, the estimate of education on adolescent crime
might be biased by the fact that we are not able to control for all the determinants of criminal
behaviors, such as the opportunity cost of crime and the profitability of criminal activities, which
may also affect adolescent educational choices. Moreover, since we are interested in estimating
the contemporaneous effects of education on crime, there may be reverse causality between
adolescent criminal behavior and their educational decisions: in this case, we could observe a
negative correlation between education and crime just because the returns of criminal activities
are so high that investments in education appear not to be convenient (Machin et al., 2011).
To identify the causal effect of education on juvenile crime we adopt a 2SLS estimation,
exploiting the exogenous variation in school attendance induced by the school leaving age reform
described in Section 2. We first estimate Equation 2 that gives the enrollment rate of adolescents
of age a in province p for each year t as a function of a binary variable Reformat, which is equal
to one for the cohorts affected by the 1999 Reform and zero otherwise. Our sample considers
14, 15 and 16 year-old students born between 1981 and 1988, where the cohorts affected by the
Reform (i.e. our treated units) are those from 1985 onwards.11 In the second step we estimate
Equation 1 by 2SLS. Identification comes from the variation in enrollment across time and ages
induced by the Reform.
10For example, for the cohorts used in our sample there is not a consistent time series of education data on
young immigrants attending high schools, nor a demographic time series of young immigrants by age and province
cells. Macro area (i.e. five dummies for the North-West, North-East, Center, South, Islands) by year fixed effects
are likely to capture the variation in offending rates induced by this sort of dynamics.
11We use a balanced sample of four treated cohorts (i.e. 1985 - 1986 - 1987 - 1988) and four control cohorts
(i.e. 1981 - 1982 - 1983 - 1984).
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The main identifying assumption for our estimation is that the change in compulsory school-
ing age legislation represents a valid and relevant instrument. An instrument for education
satisfying these requirements is such that: (i) it affects significantly the variation in enrollment,
and (ii) it is not correlated with the unobservables that influence youth criminal behavior. The
first point is confirmed by the statistical significance of the instrument, as shown in the following
sections and tables, meaning that the Reform is a strong predictor of adolescent decisions to stay
one additional year at school. The second point hinges on the assumption that the Reformat
variable could be legitimately omitted from Equation 1 and that the change in compulsory at-
tendance laws was not concerned with problems of crime. The Reform was thought to increase
the school leaving age so as to put Italy in line with most European countries. To our knowl-
edge, it was not enacted in response to concerns for juvenile delinquency, youth unemployment
or other crime related factors (Benadusi and Niceforo, 2010), but it was rather thought of as the
first step in a comprehensive reform concerning the organization of the entire education system
in Italy, which, eventually, did not even pass through Parliament. Other potential threats to
identification are discussed in detail in Section 6.
Finally, it should be acknowledged that the variation induced by the instrument is very likely
to be local, since it has an impact only on the bottom part of the education distribution and not
at the top. When we estimate the parameter θ1 using 2SLS, we are identifying a local average
treatment effect (LATE), since only adolescents at the bottom part of the distribution, i.e., at
the margin between dropping out and continuing education, are affected by the policy in their
educational choices.
In the empirical analysis, we also estimate a reduced form model of the effects of the 1999
Reform on crime, which takes the following specification:
Crimeapt = β0 + β1Reformat + β2Xapt + β3Wpt + (1 + ηj)φt + ωp + ςapt (3)
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The estimate from the crime reduced form (i.e. β1 in Equation 3) can be interpreted as an
intention-to-treat (ITT) effect. It provides an overall estimate of the consequences of raising
compulsory education by one year and it represents the relevant policy parameter.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
4.1 Data and variables construction
We collect data on the number of offenders reported to the judicial authority and high school
enrollments (grades 9, 10 and 11), for 14, 15 and 16 year-old adolescents in the years before
and after the implementation of the Reform. Our dataset is thus composed by cells defined
by the year (from 1997 to 2002), the age (14, 15 and 16) and the province.12 In the empirical
analysis we consider a time span which covers six school years (from 1997 to 2002). In 2003 a
new comprehensive educational reform was passed by the Italian Parliament and the minimum
drop-out age was reduced to the Constitutional limit in force before the 1999 Reform. For
this reason, we focus our empirical analysis on a balanced time window (before and after the
introduction of the Reform) in the years before 2003.
For each cell, we construct a measure of the involvement in criminal activity based on the
Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) official data on adolescent offenders. The ISTAT
data on adolescent offenders have the unique characteristic of offering aggregate measures of the
number of teenagers reported to the judicial authority for whom we know the exact age. Our
measure of criminal activity (i.e. the Offending Rate, OR) is then the number of adolescents
reported by the police to the judicial authority (offendersapt) over the corresponding age-year-
province population (Popapt):
12Italian provinces correspond to NUTS 3 level. Since the number of provinces in Italy increased dramatically
during the 90s, to maintain consistency of the data across years, we use the ISTAT definition of 95 provinces. Four
provinces are dropped from the analysis: three of them because part of Special Statue Regions (i.e. Val d’Aosta,
Trentino and Alto Adige) which followed a different implementation of the Reform, one (Oristano) because of
missing data.
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ORapt =
offendersapt
Popapt
× 1, 000 (4)
where p indexes the province, a ∈ (14, 15, 16) the age, and t the year. Notice that the use of
the number of adolescents reported by the police to the judicial authority is likely to be a more
accurate measure of the involvement of teenagers in criminal activities. As outlined by Jacob
and Lefgren (2003) and Machin et al. (2011), alternative measures, such as crime rates based
on the number of crimes committed, would not be as accurate in the definition of the exact
age of the offender. On the other hand, arrest rates obtained from the number of teenagers
arrested could significantly underestimate the true magnitude of the phenomenon.13 Finally,
the use of provincial and year fixed effects in all the empirical specifications limit any systematic
measurement error due to underreporting constant within geographical areas (over time) or
within periods (across areas) (Bianchi et al., 2012).
In order to measure the enrollment ratio of the cohorts relevant for our analysis, we collect
data on the number of students enrolled in high schools in each province from 1997 to 2002. We
focus on 14, 15 and 16 year olds as they represent the age group which was directly affected by
the Reform. We define the Enrollment Ratio (ER) as the number of adolescents (14, 15 and
16 year olds) who are enrolled in secondary education (enrollmentsapt) as a percentage of the
corresponding age group provincial population (Popapt):
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ERapt =
enrollmentsapt
Popapt
(5)
13In the period 2001-2005 in Italy a formal jail was started for only 48 percent of juvenile offenders reported by
the police to the judicial authority, and an even smaller figure (about 2.5 percent) were arrested and went into
prison (Dipartimento di Giustizia Minorile, 2007). As a matter of fact, most of the adolescents reported to the
judicial authority benefit from measures alternative to prison, such as correctional youth centers, family control,
jail suspension. See Dipartimento di Giustizia Minorile (2007) for details on the peculiarities of jail for offenders
under 18 in Italy.
14Conceptually, the ER can take values over 1 because of grade repeaters. For the empirical analysis, we use a
censored version of the ER as we substitute 1 in all the cases in which the ER takes values above this threshold.
While all the results also hold for the uncensored version of the ER, and are available upon request from the
authors, in a later Section we make additional robustness checks calculating a Net Enrollment Ratio, i.e. without
considering grade repeaters.
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We then merge the two datasets by year, age and province cells and link socio-economic in-
formation at the province level from different data sources (Labor Force Survey - ISTAT, Public
Finance Database - Italian Ministry of Interior, Demographic General Database - ISTAT).15 In
the analysis of the territorial heterogeneity of the effects of the Reform on adolescent crime we
also exploit measures of the pervasiveness of organized crime and Mafia-type criminal associa-
tions, and measures of social capital taken from existing economic and criminology literature.
Details on these variables are contained in Appendix A.
4.2 Descriptive statistics
[Table 1 here]
In Section 2 we described the introduction of the Reform, and illustrated rapidly the different
effects it determined in the increase of the enrollment ratio across Italian regions. In this Section
we go deeper into the descriptive analysis of the effects of the Reform both on the side of the
educational outcomes (i.e. the enrollment ratio of 14-16 year olds) and on the side of the
dependent variable (i.e. the offending rate of 14-16 year olds). First of all, Table 1 compares
the enrollment ratio of the treatment and control groups. On average, the Reform increased by
7.6 percent the overall enrollment ratio. Although males result marginally more affected (+7.7
percent) than females (+7.3 percent), the most relevant differences in the effects of the Reform
emerge splitting the sample between provinces located in the North of the country and those
located in the South. The increase in the enrollment ratio is higher in the South (+9.3 percent)
than in North (+6.7 percent). As we have already noted, this is probably due to the fact that
the two areas started from different initial levels of adolescent enrollment in high schools (lower
in the South than in the North) and converge after the implementation of the Reform. Thus, the
introduction of the Reform determined a sharp expansion in the enrollment rate starting from
the first cohort of students affected (i.e. students born in 1985). On the other hand, the same
15The match between the two measures is such that, for example, the ER for the school year 1994/95 - which
starts in mid September 1994 and ends in June 1995 - is linked to the offending rates of the year 1995.
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policy instrument introduced by the Reform (one additional year of compulsory education) had
stronger incapacitation effects in some regions (i.e. the South of the country) where a larger
share of individuals at the margins of dropping out or continuing education was obliged to take
this latter choice.
[Table 2 here]
Table 2 contains general descriptive statistics on all the dependent and independent variables
included in the empirical specifications. The average enrollment ratio is equal to 0.93, while
the average offending rate is of 20.51 adolescents reported to the judicial authority per 1,000
individuals of the corresponding age group population. Finally, in Figure 3, we show the average
residuals from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the offending rate of 14, 15
and 16 year olds (ORapt) and we include as control variables province and year fixed effects,
macro area by year fixed effects and all the time-varying control variables included in the main
empirical specification, apart from the enrollment rate (see Equation 1). The vertical lines
denote the implementation of the Reform for each age group. The offending rates decrease after
the Reform was implemented and such a decrease is sharper for 14 and 15 year olds, which were
directly influenced by the extension of the compulsory education, while it is less pronounced for
16 year olds.
[Figure 3 here]
5 Results
5.1 The crime reducing effect of education
We estimate Equation 1 using a 2SLS regression, with robust standard errors clustered at the
province level and weights equal to the corresponding age-year-province student population.16
16The use of population weighted models increases the statistical precision of the estimates. All the results are
robust to the use of alternative weights (see Section 6) and to the exclusion of weights.
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Table 3 shows our baseline results. Columns (1), (2) and (3) contain the estimates of the
parameter θ1 from Equation 1 using OLS regressions, where we progressively add the control
variables (Xapt and Wpt, column 2) and the fixed effects (column 3). Results show a negative and
statistically significant correlation between the ER and the adolescent offending rate, increasing
in magnitude (in absolute terms) and in statistical precision from the unconditional model
(column 1) to the baseline specification (column 3). This result points to a framework where the
omission of crime determinants and other control variables, as well as the inadequate control of
province, year and macro-area time-varying unobserved heterogeneity bias the estimates towards
zero.
[Table 3 here]
Column (4) presents the results from the first stage regression where we test the relevance of
our instrumental variable (Reformat in Equation 2). The coefficient is positive and statistically
significant, meaning that the 1999 Reform induced a significant increase in the enrollment ratio
of 14, 15 and 16 year olds. The first stage F-statistics lies largely above the thresholds specified
by Stock and Yogo (2005), ensuring that estimates from the 2SLS regression are not poorly
identified.
Column (5) contains our baseline 2SLS estimates: we find a negative and statistically signif-
icant effect of the ER on adolescent offending rates. An increase in the ER by one percentage
point determines a decrease in the offending rate of 50.6 incidences per 1,000 of the correspond-
ing age group population. This corresponds to a decrease of 2.47 percent with respect to the
mean offending rate. Machin et al. (2011), focusing on the long run effect of education on adult
offending rates, find that a 10 percent increase in the average school leaving age lowers crimes
of 18-40 year olds by 2.1 percent. Taking together their estimates and ours, it could be that
the crime reducing effect of education follows a decreasing path over the age of the individuals,
where the incapacitation effect prevails during the school attendance period while the human
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capital effect prevails at a later stage.
Notice that our 2SLS estimates deliver a coefficient which is larger, in absolute terms, with
respect to the OLS. This may suggest that OLS underestimates (in absolute terms) the true
effect. This result may derive from selection and composition effects. As we have already
noted, the 2SLS parameter is likely to capture a LATE on individuals who are at the margin
of continuing education or dropping out, which are also those who are potentially more at
risk of engaging in criminal activities. For instance, suppose that there might be two types
of adolescent: one type is characterized by a higher propensity to commit crime and has an
opportunity cost of continuing education larger than the one of committing crime; the second
type, instead, is characterized by a lower propensity to commit crime and a higher opportunity
cost of engaging in criminal behavior than the one of being enrolled in high school. In this
stylized scenario, it is straightforward to identify the group of compliers, who are more affected
by the Reform, in the first type of adolescents. Hence, the effect of enrollment, as identified
by the change in enrollment behavior after the Reform (i.e., the 2SLS parameter), is likely to
be higher (in absolute terms) than the correlation found using OLS. This also means that the
Reform has been more effective in the lower part of the education distribution and that a policy
affecting the upper part of the distribution could not be as effective in decreasing crime.
In column (6) we report the OLS estimate for the crime reduced form effect of the 1999
Reform on adolescent offending rates (β1 in Equation 3). We find that one additional year of
compulsory education reduces the offending rate of 14, 15 and 16 year olds by 4.6 incidences
per 1,000 of the corresponding age group population which, in relative terms, represents a 22.4
percent decrease of the offending rate. The effect is in line with the existing literature. For
instance, Anderson (2013) finds that the exposure to a minimum drop-out age of 18 reduces the
arrest rate for 16 to 18 year olds by 17.2 percent. Our estimates are a bit larger in magnitude:
this could be due to the use of offending rate rather than arrest rates, as the latter are likely to
underestimate the true effect. This coefficient is also larger than the 2SLS estimate presented
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before, since it may incorporate any indirect or spillover effect of the Reform.
So far, our analysis has provided evidence of the crime reducing effect of education (hereafter
labeled CREE to ease the exposition) in the Italian context. However, we have also seen that
the Reform has had different effects across the Italian territory. In other words, the Reform
induced the same incapacitation treatment (i.e. one additional year of education to be spent at
school) on all Italian students at the same instant in time, but it determined different percentage
increases in the enrollment ratio, which are predominantly due to the enrollment rate level in
each area before the implementation of the Reform. As a result, the Reform had different
effects on the territory, increasing the enrollment ratio especially in Southern regions. Do these
heterogeneous effects on enrollment translate also on differential effects on crime rates?
5.2 Territorial heterogeneity
The issue of the heterogeneity of the crime reducing effects of education has still found little
attention in the literature. Only Luallen (2006) shows that sizable effects of increasing the
number of days at school on youth crime rates are present in urban and not in rural areas.
Hence, little is known about the role of territorial characteristics. In the Italian context, where
we have documented deep differences in the effect of the Reform between the North and the
South of the country, we may expect a stronger reduction in crime rates in areas where the
incapacitation induced by the Reform has been higher. Thus, as a first step in the analysis
of the heterogeneous effects, we test whether the CREE is statistically different in the South
and in the North of the country. To this purpose, we estimate Equation 1 using a 2SLS fully
interacted model where the interactions are constructed with a dummy variable taking value 1
for all provinces located in the South and 0 otherwise.17
[Table 4 here]
17Our results do not change if we perform the analysis of the heterogeneous effects (Sections 5.2 and 5.3) with
sample splits instead of using fully interacted models. Results are available upon request.
17
The first-stage regression in Table 4 (column 1) confirms that the Reform had larger effects
in the South (+9 percent) than in the North (+7 percent). As the additional year of educa-
tion imposed by the compulsory education Reform mostly influenced the decisions of those at
the margin of dropping out before secondary education and most likely to engage in criminal
activities, we would expect our coefficient for the CREE (θ1 from Equation 1) to be larger in
areas where the Reform pushed to school a larger share of these individuals (i.e., in the South).
However, the 2SLS and the crime reduced form estimates in Table 4 (columns 2) show opposite
results, revealing that the CREE is larger in the North than the South. In absolute terms,
an increase by one percentage point of the enrollment ratio reduces adolescent offending rates
by almost 3.4 percent in the North and by less than a half (1.6 percent) in the South. Similar
results hold for the effect in the reduced form equation (column 3).
In order to understand this puzzling result, one should bear in mind that incapacitation
(i.e., time to be spent at school instead of on the street) is not the only mechanism with which
enrollment might affect crime. Another mechanism that applies to this framework is the so-
called human capital effect, according to which the time spent at school contributes to increase
the opportunity cost of committing a crime and enlarges the set of labor market opportunities
that adolescents can find in the legal labor market. Finally, there might be an important role
played by social interactions, even if it is not clear in which direction they could affect crime.
For instance, staying at school an additional year may force adolescents with more propensity
to commit crime to face their peers with lower criminal propensity and this may negatively
affect their criminal behavior, either contemporaneously or over time. However, if at school
adolescents only interact with bad peers engaged in criminal activities, this could reinforce,
instead of decrease, the youth crime rate. In the next Section, we try to shed some lights on
these mechanisms and try to explain why they have different effects across the Italian territory.
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5.3 The role of institutions, social capital and organized crime
Why does the same incapacitation treatment yield different CREE, all things being equal,
across the territory? And, more specifically, why do we observe the counter-intuitive results
that in the areas where the policy induced a higher incapacitation effect, pushing to schools
a larger fraction of marginal students, the CREE is lower? As a matter of fact, the same
treatment of incapacitation has differential effects on the territory and this could plausibly be
due to the different importance that alternative channels might have in the different areas of the
country. In what follows, we test whether the quality of local institutions, as proxied by classical
measures of social capital, the presence and pervasiveness of organized crime, and school system
characteristics might help to explain the territorial heterogeneity in the CREE that we have
documented in the previous Section. To this purpose, we collect different measures on social
capital, on school characteristics and on the pervasiveness of organized crime, at the province
level, and include them in the baseline 2SLS regressions using fully interacted models.
In particular, we use two measures of social capital largely exploited in the existing literature
starting from Guiso et al. (2004), notably Electoral participation and Blood donations. We
interpret social capital in the sense of civic capital (Guiso et al., 2004) and as a general proxy
for the quality of local (formal and informal) institutions. In this sense, a higher social capital
would increase the quality of social interactions as well as the expected returns from human
capital accumulation: hence, areas with higher levels of social capital may be more likely to
favor the development of a human capital effect, in addition to the direct incapacitation effect.
School characteristics are proxied by the average class size and student-to-teacher ratio.
Areas with a lower average class size or a lower student-to-teacher ratio could be characterized
by higher levels of social interactions within the classroom, but also better teaching environments
and strong teacher monitoring, so that the development of the human capital effect or of the
externalities induced by social interactions could be favored.
We use two measures to identify areas where organized crime is more pervasive and it is likely
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to heavily influence everyday life and student behavior in the school and out of the school. The
first is the Mafia Index taken from Calderoni (2011), which is a comprehensive measure of the
presence of organized crime in each province. The second is a territorial rule such that we classify
as Mafia regions all provinces located in the three regions where mafia-type organizations were
historically born and are still heavily pervasive in the economic and social networks, notably
Campania, Calabria and Sicily (Lupo, 1993, Pinotti, 2012). Detailed information and descriptive
statistics on these variables are contained in Appendix A.18
[Table 5 here]
Each interaction variable, with the only exception of the dummy for Mafia regions, is first
standardized with zero mean and unitary standard deviation and then included in the fully
interacted model (Nannicini et al., 2013). Results are presented in Table 5. The estimates
reveal that the effects of the ER are always negative and statistically significant, while the
interaction terms highlight important heterogeneous patterns. The CREE increases with the
degree of social capital at the province level. This result is statistically significant for the measure
of electoral participation, but not for blood donation. According to column 1, an increase in
social capital equal to 1 standard deviation would reduce the adolescent offending rate by 15.2
incidences per 1,000 of the corresponding age-group population (thus, increasing in absolute
value the CREE). Moving from the lowest level of social capital (recorded in the Southern
province of Agrigento) to the average level would reduce the offending rate by 33.98 additional
incidences per 1,000 of the corresponding age-group population, or, in absolute terms, it would
increase the CREE by 1.66 percent.19
18Our results are robust to the use of alternative measures of social capital, such as the cheating scores exploited
by Paccagnella and Sestito (2014) and Guiso et al. (2013), as well as to other measures of the pervasiveness of
organized crime.
19The lowest level of social capital according to the Electoral participation measure, recorded in the province of
Agrigento, is equal to -2.23. Moving from this level to the zero average level implies increasing the level of social
capital by 2.23 standard deviations, corresponding to 33.98 incidences per 1,000 (2.23∗15.24 = 33.98). The overall
effect of enrollment rate on the adolescent offending rate is then equal to a reduction of 55.28 + 33.98 = 91.26
incidences per 1,000. The percentage reduction in adolescent offending rate induced by the change in social capital
is equal to ((−91.26 ∗ 0.01)/20.51) ∗ 100 = −4.45 percent, while, without social capital, the percentage CREE
is equal to ((−57.28 ∗ 0.01)/20.51) ∗ 100 = −2.79. The difference between the two leads to a 2.79 − 4.45 = 1.66
percent increase, in absolute values, of the CREE.
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In columns 3 and 4, we observe that increasing the average class size or the student-to-
teacher ratio would reduce the CREE. This finding is consistent with several mechanisms.
For example, increasing class size or student-to-teacher ratio would determine a lower level of
monitoring, during school hours, and, plausibly, a lower quality of the education production
process, but it could also increase occasions for social interactions with peers within the class or
at school. The fact that we find a lower CREE (in absolute terms) in areas characterized by high
class size or student-to-teacher ratio implies that social interactions at school may play a negative
role and may also prevent the development of a human capital effect after the implementation
of the Reform.
The estimates in columns 5 and 6 reveal that the CREE is highly influenced by the presence
of organized crime, and this result holds for both measures of organized crime. For example,
estimates in column 5 show that an increase in the Mafia Index equal to 1 standard deviation
would increase the adolescent offending rate by 15.5 incidences per 1,000 of the corresponding
age-group population (thus, decreasing in absolute value the CREE). Moving from the highest
level of Mafia pervasiveness (recorded in the Southern province of Reggio di Calabria) to the
average level would reduce the offending rate by 46.34 additional incidences per 1,000 of the
corresponding age-group population, or, in absolute terms, it would increase the CREE by 2.25
percent. According to column 6, a one percentage point increase in the enrollment ratio would
reduce the adolescent offending rate by 1.33 percent in Mafia regions compared to almost 3.18
percent in the rest of the country. This finding could be easily rationalized. In areas where
Mafia-type criminal associations are pervasive, the presence of criminal networks (inside and
outside the school) could facilitate the engagement in criminal behaviors of youths, increase
the expected value of participating in criminal activities and reduce its social costs. Criminal
networks and criminal organizations offer more opportunities to commit crimes, via social in-
teractions mechanisms, but also they protect their own affiliates, thus lowering the perceived
probability of being caught by the police, and guarantee a fixed amount of illegal rent which
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could be competitive with respect to the legal labor market opportunities.
Turning back to the differential effects of the Reform across Italian regions that we have
documented in Table 4, we now focus separately on the provinces located in Northern and
Southern Italy, and repeat the analysis of the heterogeneous effects. This is because we want to
test whether the channels that we disentangled affect the CREE differently in the two areas of
the country, being, for instance, prevalent in one area and not in the other.
[Table 6 here]
Results in Table 6 present important differences with respect to those calculated on the
whole sample of provinces (Table 5). The heterogeneous effects given by the social capital
channel cannot be clearly related to one group of provinces or to the other, and the direction
found in the previous analysis is confirmed for Southern provinces only. The effects of school
characteristics are relevant in Northern provinces only, while the effect of the pervasiveness
of Mafia-type criminal organizations is only statistically significant in the group of Southern
provinces. Improving the quality of the educational system, in terms of simple policy indicators
such as class size and student-to-teacher ratio, would not help to increase the CREE in areas at
risk, while reducing the pervasiveness of organized crime and increasing civicness would entail
benefits in the reduction of adolescent criminal behavior only in these areas.
Our results suggest that the incapacitation effect of one additional year of schooling can have
different effects on adolescent offending rates, depending on several local characteristics. First
of all, the fact that we always find lower effects (in absolute terms) in areas characterized by
pervasive Mafia-type criminal organizations and lower levels of social capital may suggest that
spending additional time at school is not enough to determine an effective incapacitation effect
in areas at risk. In fact, we should expect in these areas higher rewards for criminal activities,
so that adolescents may still find profitable to engage in criminal behavior when they are not
at school. Second, the human capital effect could reinforce the incapacitation mechanism that
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we observe. This effect may depend on school quality as well as on the activities performed
at school. Both these implications point to the fact that in areas characterized by pervasive
organized crime, preventing youths from staying on the streets is not enough to ensure the same
level of crime reduction that we find in areas where organized crime is not pervasive.
6 Robustness checks
We test the robustness of our estimates over several dimensions and report the results in Table
7.
[Table 7 here]
In our empirical analysis, identification comes from the comparison of crime rates between
ages and cohorts, exploiting the timing of the implementation of the Reform. One important
assumption of our strategy is that cohorts are comparable across ages, namely between 14
and 16 years old. However, after the first two years of high school (i.e. grades 9 and 10),
school characteristics may change as all types of high schools (academic, vocational, technical)
may separate the educational path between the first two years (the so called biennio) and the
remaining years. For this reason, we test our results adding in the baseline specification a dummy
variable which takes value 1 for 9th and 10th graders (i.e. 14 and 15 year olds students), and 0
for 11th (16 year olds). Results are presented in column 1 of Table 7 and are still statistically
significant, although smaller in magnitude. This is consistent with the fact that, in this case,
identification comes only from the discontinuity in crime rates between 14 and 15 year olds.
Threats to our identification may also come from any sort of omitting variable bias. This
could arise from territorial by year variations, which are not adequately captured by our control
variables, and by the set of fixed effects and macro area by year fixed effects included in all
the specifications. In this regard, in column 2 of Table 7, we repeat the analysis adding region
by year fixed effects. The results do not change significantly from the baseline (Table 3), thus
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reassuring us that macro area by year fixed effects adequately capture relevant territorial by
year variations for which we cannot directly control for. In columns 3 and 4 we also add to the
baseline specification linear and quadratic time trends: both the reduced form and the 2SLS
results are always close to the baseline.20
Another aspect which may be a source of measurement error in our estimates is the presence
of grade repeaters for whom we cannot establish the exact match between enrollments and
offending measures. To test whether this is a relevant issue in our exercise, in column 5 of Table
7 we repeat the baseline analysis using the Net Enrollment Ratio (instead of the simple, or raw,
enrollment ratio used so far), calculated as the enrollment ratio net of grade repeaters. The first
stage is always statistically significant and the estimated effects are in line with the baseline in
Table 3. We do not use the Net Enrollment Ratio in the main analysis as the methodology of
recording grade repeaters in the official statistics is not consistent through the years used in the
empirical analysis, and, in some years, the information is missing.21
In column 6 we implement a specification in which more weight is given to the cohorts
closer to the year of implementation of the Reform (i.e. Inverse Distance Weight, IDW ). The
weight is equal to 1/d where d is the distance in birth years from the discontinuity (Machin
et al., 2011). The estimates do not substantially differ from the baseline: the coefficients are
marginally larger, confirming that identification comes prevailingly from variation close to the
discontinuity induced by the Reform.
The main analysis has been performed considering a period of time ranging between the
school years 1997/98 and 2003/04, with 4 cohorts affected by the Reform and 4 cohorts unaf-
fected. However, it could be that the longer the period of time used in the empirical specification,
the more difficult it is to satisfy the main assumptions used for identification, namely the com-
20We add 18 regional dummies interacted with the year dummies. Our results are also robust to the inclusion
of province by year fixed effects and region-specific linear and quadratic time trends (available upon request).
21For the estimation presented in column 5 of Table 7 the number of grade repeaters in the school years 1998/99
and 1999/00 are missing and thus estimated with OLS regressions exploiting all the school years for which the
information is available and imputed in the dataset. We are aware of the fact that this procedure applied in the
first year of implementation of the Reform (1999/00) is likely to determine a downward bias which might explain
why the estimates are sensibly smaller compared to the baseline.
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parability between ages and cohorts. To test for this, we repeat the estimation keeping only
4 school years, from 1998/99 to 2001/02, but results presented in column 7 are close to our
baseline (Table 3).
We perform additional specification tests concerning the functional form chosen for the re-
gression model (results available upon request). As in most of the existing literature, we exploit
OLS regressions which allow to estimate in a flexible and robust way instrumental variable
models. However, our results do not change defining the dependent variable as the natural loga-
rithm of the offending rate and replacing a zero when the logarithm is not defined (Bianchi et al.,
2012, Fougere et al., 2009, Oster and Agell, 2007). It is also widely recognized that crime mea-
sures have a count-data nature and sometimes present distributions which are left skewed and
might be appropriately estimated with count-data models (Jacob and Lefgren, 2003, Luallen,
2006, Osgood, 2000): our results are also robust tho the use of negative binomial or Poisson
regressions.
7 Conclusions and policy implications
The causes of the territorial heterogeneity in the pattern of crime rates have long been debated in
the literature. Glaeser et al. (1996) show that only 30 percent of the patterns in crime rates across
areas are explained by observable area characteristics, and that social interactions may play a
substantive role in explaining such variations. Akomak and ter Weel (2012) show that social
capital may explain an important part of the territorial variability in crime rates. Concerning
the causal relation between education and crime, Luallen (2006) finds that the incapacitation
effect of school causes a statistically significant decrease in the youth crime rate only in urban
areas.
In this paper, we estimate the causal link between school attendance and adolescent offend-
ing rate, exploiting the implementation of a Reform, which has increased compulsory education
by one year. In our baseline analysis, adopting a 2SLS estimation using the Reform as an instru-
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ment, we find that a one percentage point increase in enrollment rate at high school (grades 9 to
11) decreases the adolescent offending rate by 2.47 percent with respect to the mean. However,
this crime reducing effect of education shows a substantial territorial heterogeneity. In fact,
although experiencing a higher increase in enrollment after the implementation of the Reform,
provinces in Southern Italy are characterized by a lower crime reducing effect of education: a
one percentage point increase in enrollment rate would decrease the adolescent offending rate
by 3.4 percent in Northern provinces and by less than a half in the South.
Education might affect youth criminal behavior through several channels, which can play
different role across the territory. In addition to the incapacitation effect, so that adolescents
are forced to stay at school, so that they are not able to commit crime, there might be at least
two other mechanisms: the human capital effect hinges on the idea that being at school makes
adolescents less willing to engage in criminal activities, increasing their return to education and
their labor market opportunities in the legal system; social interactions at school may either
decrease or increase adolescent involvement in criminal activities, depending on the types of
interaction that take place.
We try to shed some light on these channels, and on how they change across Italian terri-
tory, interacting the variable of interest (i.e., enrollment rate) with measures of social capital,
school characteristics and organized crime, and then performing these analyses for Southern and
Northern provinces, separately. When we consider the entire country, we find that in areas char-
acterized by higher levels of social capital the crime reducing effect of education is stronger (in
absolute value) than in areas with lower levels of social capital; school characteristics, implying
less monitoring and worse teaching environment, lower the crime reducing effect of education,
in absolute terms. The crime reducing effect of education is found to be lower in regions char-
acterized by a pervasive presence of Mafia-type organizations: a one percentage point increase
in enrollment rate in the Mafia regions leads to a reduction in crime rate equal to 1.33 percent,
while the same change in enrollment in non-Mafia regions determines a drop in crime rate equal
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to 3.18 percent. When we estimate the fully interacted models separately for Northern and
Southern regions, we find that school characteristics play a role only in the Northern regions,
while social capital and organized crime matter only for provinces in the South.
Southern Italy is an area where Mafia-type criminal organizations deeply influence social
life and economic activities (Mete, 2009, Pinotti, 2012). Growing up and attending school in
such areas may have important effects on adolescent criminal behavior (Cederna, 2013, Ciccotti
et al., 2007). Our results suggest that the incapacitation effect of one additional year of schooling
can have different effects on adolescent offending rates depending on school characteristics, the
quality of local institutions, and the pervasiveness of organized crime, so that spending additional
time at school is not enough to determine strong incapacitation effects in areas at risk. In fact,
in these areas young criminals might find illegal activities more easily and with higher reward,
so that adolescents still find it profitable to engage in criminal behavior when they are not at
school.
School quality, as proxied by relevant policy variables such as class size and student-to-
teacher ratio, do not seem relevant in areas at risk. This could be due to the fact that the
increased quality of the education production process is counterbalanced by an increase in social
interactions with peers. On the contrary, the presence of organized crime and the quality of local
institutions and social networks (as proxied by measures of social capital) do explain part of the
heterogeneity in the crime reducing effect of education. These results may depend on different
mechanisms. First, it could be the case that the incapacitation effect of school attendance
on adolescent criminal behavior is more effective in areas where criminal organizations do not
take control of the illegal market, or in areas where young criminals prevalently act in isolation
(notably, the North of the country). Second, it could also be that the incapacitation effect
of school in the Southern regions is not as effective as in the North because the time that
adolescents spend out of school in the afternoons is sufficient to build a criminal career in areas
where criminal opportunities are less scarce and more organized. Third, the human capital
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channel might be less effective in areas where a criminal career is relatively easier to start
and more diffused. Finally, the existence of criminal networks among adolescents or between
adolescents and adults could also determine important differences according to the strength and
pervasiveness of these networks on social life.
The evidence we present points to the fact that in areas characterized by pervasive organized
crime, keeping youths at school simply to prevent them from staying on the street, is not enough
to ensure the same level of crime reduction as could be reached in areas where organized crime is
not pervasive. Still, the human capital effect could reinforce the incapacitation mechanism that
we observe: for example, education policies should be aimed at increasing the sense of civic duty
and legality and to design adequate school activities for students living in areas where illegal
opportunities seem more profitable than the legal activities.
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A Appendix. Measures of social capital and organized crime
In the analysis of the heterogeneous effects, we use several measures of social capital and or-
ganized crime. In this Section we briefly illustrate each of these measures and provide some
descriptive statistics.
We define social capital as civic capital, that is, those persistent and shared beliefs and values
that help a group overcome the free rider problem in the pursuit of socially valuable activities
Guiso et al. (2010). The two measures of social capital are taken from (Guiso et al., 2004) and
are extensively used in the existing literature: Electoral participation (Social Capital measure
1) refers to the average electoral turnout for all the referenda that occurred in Italy between
1946 and 1989, Blood donations (Social Capital measure 2) refers to the number of blood bags
collected per inhabitant in each province in 1995.
The Mafia Index is taken from Calderoni (2011) and it is obtained with a principal component
technique exploiting several measures of the presence of organized crime in the Italian provinces
(Mafia type criminal offenses, mafia murders, city councils dissolved for infiltration by organized
crime, and assets confiscated from organized crime) covering the period between 1983 and 2009.
The Mafia Index highlights not only the strong concentration of the mafias in their original
territories but also their significant presence in the central and northern provinces. Mafia regions
include the provinces in the Southern regions where Mafia-type organizations were historically
born and developed (i.e. provinces in Campania, Calabria and Sicily); Non-Mafia regions include
the provinces in all the other regions (Lupo, 1993, Mete, 2009).
Finally, the school characteristics (average class size and average student-to-teacher ratio
at the provincial level) are taken from ISTAT (2007) and refer to the school year 1997-98 (i.e.
before the introduction of the Reform). Figure A.1 shows the geographical distribution of each
(raw) measure while in the empirical analysis we standardize each variable so as to have zero
mean and unitary standard deviation.
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Figures
Figure 1
Secondary education enrollment ratio: historical trend.
NOTES: the graph shows the historical trend of the enrollment ratio for secondary education (grades 9 to 13). The historical
series is provided by ISTAT (Italian Statistics Bureau) and it is calculated as the ratio between the number of students
enrolled in secondary education and the number of resident citizens aged between 14 and 18. The squared dot highlights
the school year immediately after the introduction of the 1999 compulsory schooling Reform, the vertical lines delimit the
period of observation used in the baseline empirical analysis. SOURCE: ISTAT, Historical Series.
Figure 2
Average enrollment ratio by cohort: geographical detail.
NOTES: the graph shows the average enrollment ratio of 14, 15 and 16 year olds students (grades 9 to 11) by cohort. The
vertical line denotes the introduction of the 1999 Reform. SOURCE: ISTAT and MIUR.
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Figure 3
Trends in the offending rates by age group.
NOTES: the graphs show residuals from OLS regressions of the offending rates on the set of time-variant control variables
and fixed effects. Control variables include the share of youth living in an urban area (Urban share), the share of males
(Male share), the average occupation rate for 15-14 year olds (Occupation rate (15-24)), the logarithm of the provincial per
capita Value Added (2012 euros) (ln(provincial pc VA)), the logarithm of provincial population (ln(provincial population)).
Fixed effects include year, province and macro area by year fixed effects. Vertical lines denote the year at which each age
group has been affected by the Reform. SOURCE: own elaborations from ISTAT and MIUR.
35
Figure A.1
Measures of social capital, school characteristics and organized crime pervasiveness.
NOTES: Electoral participation refers to the average electoral turnout for all the referenda that occurred in Italy between
1946 and 1989; Blood donations refers to the number of blood bags collected per inhabitant in each province in 1995.
Average class size and average student-to-teacher ratio (i.e. stud./teach. ratio) at the provincial level are taken from
ISTAT (2007) and refer to the school year 1997-98. The Mafia Index is taken from Calderoni (2011); Mafia regions include
the provinces in the Southern regions where Mafia-type organizations were historically born and developed (i.e. provinces
in Campania, Calabria and Sicily); Non-Mafia regions include the provinces in all the other regions.
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Tables
Table 1
Descriptive statistics: the effects of the 1999 Reform on enrollment ratio.
N Cohorts not affected Cohorts affected Difference Percentage increase
Overall 1638 0.898 0.967 0.068 7.614
Males 1638 0.894 0.963 0.069 7.694
Females 1638 0.897 0.962 0.066 7.322
North 1044 0.911 0.972 0.061 6.701
South 594 0.877 0.958 0.081 9.280
NOTES: all the differences are statistically significant at the p < 0.01 confidence level.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
mean sd max min N
Offending rate 20.512 12.332 114.478 0.000 1638
Enrollment ratio 0.933 0.085 1.000 0.605 1638
Urban share 0.144 0.200 0.877 0.000 1638
Male share 0.506 0.018 0.585 0.432 1638
Occupation rate (15-24) 31.651 10.684 49.595 12.066 1638
Provincial per capita VA 14841.5 6374.4 43167.9 6463.4 1638
Provincial population 612978.7 642947.8 3922982 89775 1638
NOTES: Offending rates are calculated per 1,000 of the corresponding province-age population. Urban share refers to
the share of youth living in an urban area, Male share to the share of males, Occupation rate (15-24) is the the average
occupation rate for 15-24 year olds, provincial pc VA refers to the provincial per capita Value Added (deflated in 2012
Euros), provincial population refers to the total provincial population.
Table 3
Baseline results.
Offending rate
OLS First stage 2SLS Reduced form
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ER -10.58 -19.80** -46.00*** -50.60***
(6.66) (7.68) (4.04) (6.76)
Reform 0.08*** -4.60***
(0.01) (0.41)
First stage F-stat. 105.54
N.Clusters 91 91 91 91 91 91
N.Observations 1638 1638 1638 1638 1638 1638
Mean of dep. var. 20.51 20.51 20.51 20.51 20.51 20.51
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes
NOTES: population weighted models estimated on age-year-province cells. Control variables include the share of youth
living in an urban area (Urban share), the share of males (Male share), the average occupation rate for 15-24 year olds
(Occupation rate (15-24)), the logarithm of the provincial per capita Value Added (2012 euros) (ln(provincial pc VA)),
the logarithm of provincial population (ln(provincial population)). Fixed effects include year, province and macro area by
year fixed effects. The First stage F-stat. refers to the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistics. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis, clustered at the province level. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01 levels.
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Table 4
Territorial differences between North and South
Offending rate
First stage 2SLS RF OLS
(1) (2) (3)
ER -69.63***
(10.86)
South dummy * ER 36.39***
(12.64)
Reform 0.07*** -5.36***
(0.01) (0.45)
South dummy * Reform 0.02* 1.86**
(0.01) (0.79)
First stage F-stat. 21.85
Mean of dep. var. 20.51 20.51 20.51
N.Clusters 91 91 91
N.Observations 1638 1638 1638
NOTES: population weighted models estimated on age-year-province cells, fully interacted models. For the control variables
and the fixed effects included in all the specifications see Table 3. The South dummy is equal to 1 for provinces in the
South of Italy (0 otherwise). The First stage F-stat. refers to the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistics. Robust standard
errors in parenthesis, clustered at the province level. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01 levels.
Table 5
Heterogeneous effects: social capital, school characteristics and organized crime.
Offending rate (2SLS)
Social Capital School characteristics Organized crime
Electoral Blood Student/teacher Class Mafia Mafia
participation donation ratio size Index regions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ER -57.28*** -51.64*** -55.24*** -57.33*** -61.90*** -65.21***
(6.78) (5.80) (7.52) (7.48) (7.71) (9.22)
Interaction variable * ER -15.24*** -6.74 19.51** 17.76** 15.50*** 37.88***
(4.66) (6.30) (8.02) (7.01) (3.63) (11.52)
First stage F-stat. 40.64 20.62 46.96 25.79 39.72 31.70
Mean of dep. var. 20.51 20.51 20.51 20.51 20.51 20.51
N.Clusters 89 89 91 91 91 91
N.Observations 1602 1602 1638 1638 1638 1638
NOTES: population weighted models estimated on age-year-province cells, fully interacted models. For the control variables
and the fixed effects included in all the specifications see Table 3; for the definitions of social capital measures, school
characteristics and organized crime measures see Section A. The First stage F-stat. refers to the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald
F-statistics. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the province level. Asterisks denote statistical significance
at the * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 levels.
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Table 6
Heterogeneous effects within North and South.
Offending rate (2SLS)
Social Capital School characteristics Organized crime
Electoral Blood Student/teacher Class Mafia
participation donation ratio size Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: North
ER -70.77*** -73.51*** -79.74*** -79.93*** -64.73***
(11.25) (11.91) (13.19) (13.41) (8.51)
Interaction variable * ER 33.17* 27.66 23.75** 23.77** -9.14
(19.56) (18.01) (11.37) (11.91) (14.91)
First stage F-stat. 4.20 4.37 15.55 16.57 3.13
Mean of dep. var. 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82 22.82
N.Clusters 57 57 58 58 58
N.Observations 1026 1026 1044 1044 1044
Panel B: South
ER -38.40*** -34.22*** -31.74*** -34.21*** -49.09***
(6.30) (6.28) (5.71) (5.90) (10.88)
Interaction variable * ER -16.24*** -7.12 11.73 9.69 20.51**
(4.24) (5.93) (7.64) (6.38) (8.95)
First stage F-stat. 29.77 52.78 52.03 51.59 16.77
Mean of dep. var. 16.45 16.45 16.45 16.45 16.45
N.Clusters 32 32 33 33 33
N.Observations 576 576 594 594 594
NOTES: population weighted models estimated on age-year-province cells, fully interacted models. For the control variables
and the fixed effects included in all the specifications see Table 3; for the definitions of social capital measures, school
characteristics and organized crime measures see Section A. The First stage F-stat. refers to the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald
F-statistics. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the province level. Asterisks denote statistical significance
at the * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 levels.
Table 7
Robustness analysis.
Offending rate
Alternative specifications Net Enr IDW 1998-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Reduced form OLS
Reform -1.70*** -4.46*** -4.60*** -4.60*** -4.60*** -4.74*** -4.46***
(0.32) (0.42) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.55) (0.41)
Panel B: 2SLS
ER -29.59*** -49.30*** -50.60*** -50.62*** -40.69*** -62.55*** -50.02***
(6.26) (6.68) (6.76) (6.75) (4.16) (8.02) (6.48)
First stage F-stat. 76.90 100.27 105.54 105.52 258.00 169.40 107.95
N.Clusters 91 91 91 91 91 91 91
N.Observations 1638 1638 1638 1638 1638 1638 1092
Mean of dep. var. 20.51 20.51 20.51 20.51 20.51 20.51 20.08
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Baseline fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Age group FE yes
Region by year FE yes
Linear time trend yes
Quadratic time trend yes
NOTES: specification in column (1) includes fixed effects for age group (1 if age equal to 14 or 15 and 0 otherwise);
specification in column (2) includes region by year fixed effects; specification in column (3) includes a linear time trend;
specification in column (4) includes a quadratic time trend; specification in column (5) exploits the net enrollment ratio;
specification in column (6) exploits inverse distance weights; specification in column (7) uses a subsample restricted to a
time window of four years (1998-2001). For the control variables and the fixed effects included in all the specifications see
Table 3. The First stage F-stat. refers to the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistics. Robust standard errors in parenthesis,
clustered at the province level. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 levels.
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